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A Consumers’ Guide to  
Sentencing Reform: 
Reflections on Zimring’s  
Cautionary Tale 
Richard S. Frase† 
In 1976, Frank Zimring published a short essay1 warning that 
several major sentencing reform proposals of the mid-1970s, if adopted, 
might actually make matters worse.2 Zimring focused primarily on two 
reforms: abolition of parole release discretion, and substantial reduction 
of judicial sentencing discretion by means of legislatively prescribed 
presumptive sentences for each crime. He argued that parole abolition 
proposals were ignoring some important covert functions of parole 
discretion, and that both parole abolition and sharply reduced sentencing 
discretion would confront major challenges and negative unintended 
consequences. At the same time, Zimring’s essay begins by 
acknowledging the “current crisis [of] the American system of criminal 
justice,” and ends by conceding that “no matter what the problems with 
particular reforms, the present system is intolerable.”3  In this essay I will 
review the major sentencing reforms that have been enacted since the 
1970s, and assess the accuracy of Zimring’s predictions about the impacts 
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 1  Franklin E. Zimring, Making the Punishment Fit the Crime: A Consumers’ Guide to 
Sentencing Reform, 12 U. CHI. L. SCH. OCCASIONAL PAPERS 1 (1977).  
 2  The reform proposals cited by Zimring included the following: NORVAL MORRIS, THE 
FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT (1974); JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME (1975); 
ERNST VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMINALS (1975); ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING 
JUSTICE – THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS, THE REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE FOR THE STUDY 
OF INCARCERATION (1976); DAVID FOGEL, WE ARE THE LIVING PROOF: THE JUSTICE 
MODEL OF CORRECTIONS (1975); and TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING, FAIR AND 
CERTAIN PUNISHMENT – REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL 
SENTENCING (1976). 
 3  Zimring, supra note 1, at 3, 15. 
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of these reforms. I will also suggest some lessons we can learn from the 
study of past reform efforts and about the processes of implementing and 
assessing such reforms. Some of the lessons are discouraging; on the other 
hand, some reforms have turned out better than could have been predicted. 
Like his earlier critique of pretrial diversion programs4 and some 
of his later writings,5 Zimring brought a valuable “system” perspective to 
his critique of sentencing reform proposals.  In particular, he emphasized 
the “multiple discretions” and multiple forms of “sentencing” that exist 
within American criminal justice systems, the ways in which these 
discretions interact, and the strong likelihood that reductions in one form 
of discretion will simply increase the discretionary power of other actors 
and institutions.6 Zimring’s skepticism of major structural reforms in 
sentencing discretion served as a valuable cautionary tale. It may very 
well have helped the designers of some of the reforms implemented in 
later years lessen the adverse consequences Zimring warned us about. 
But Zimring and others’ writing in the mid-1970s could not 
foresee the most serious challenge all American sentencing regimes 
would face in later years: mass incarceration.7 Equally unforeseeable were 
the solutions that some jurisdictions found to deal with the reform 
challenges Zimring identified. Those solutions included a wider range of 
sentencing reform options and tools other than the ones that were being 
 
 4  Franklin E. Zimring, Measuring the Impact of Pretrial Diversion from the Criminal 
Justice System, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 224 (1974). 
 5  See, e.g., FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & RICHARD S. FRASE, THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM: MATERIALS ON THE ADMINISTRATION AND REFORM OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 
(1980). 
 6  Zimring, supra note 1, at 4. 
 7  Although the steady rise in prison rates per capita was already well underway by the 
mid-1970s, it was not until the end of the decade that the trend was clearly evident. 1976 
was the first year in which the national prison rate exceeded 120 inmates per 100,000 
population (the upper end of the range within which the rate had varied during the 
previous 45 years), and final data for that year were not published until February of 1979.  
See Franklin E. Zimring, The Scale of Imprisonment in the United States: Twentieth 
Century Patterns and Twenty-first Century Prospects, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
1225, 1227 (2010), Figure 1 (reporting U.S. prison rates from 1930 to 1970); U.S. Dept..); 
U.S. Dept. of Justice, Prisoners in State and Federal Institutions on December 31, 1976 
(1979) and similar reports for 1971 to 1975 and 1977; E. ANN CARSON, IMPRISONMENT 
RATE OF SENTENCED PRISONERS UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF STATE OR FEDERAL 
CORRECTIONAL AUTHORITIES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS (Oct. 2017), 
https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=nps (listing annual federal and state prison rates from 
1978 through 2016) (select: “Quick Tables”, then “Imprisonment Rates”). Indeed, as late 
as 1979 highly-respected scholars such as Alfred Blumstein were still publishing works 
that assumed long-term stability in incarceration rates. See Zimring, supra, at 1227. 
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proposed in the mid-1970s, and the evolution of a novel institution that 
was first proposed at the start of that decade but had not yet been 
implemented anywhere: the sentencing guidelines commission.8 Indeed, 
the Consumer’s Guide warned that “[p]redicting the impact of any of the 
current crop of reform proposals with any degree of certainty is a 
hazardous if not foolhardy occupation”9 —or, as Yogi Berra supposedly 
said: “It’s tough to make predictions, especially about the future.”10 And 
yet, as Zimring also seemed to recognize, we must not allow ourselves to 
be paralyzed by doubt and uncertainty – we must try to find ways to limit 
the lawless systems of unfettered sentencing and parole discretion that 
still exist in most American states, while also doing what we can to avoid 
the worst adverse consequences of reform.11 
The remainder of this essay is organized as follows. Part A 
summarizes the key points in Zimring’s Consumer’s Guide, and shows 
why they provided then, and still provide today, important reasons for 
skepticism and caution when designing major structural sentencing 
reforms. Part B examines reforms adopted in the years after Zimring 
wrote his essay, to see which of them have encountered the problems he 
identified. The first section in this part focuses on parole abolition (with 
or without sentencing reform), while the remaining sections examine 
three examples of structured sentencing reform: legislative presumptive 
sentencing rules, which were first adopted in California, and two very 
different types of sentencing guidelines reform—in the federal courts 
(pre-Booker),12 and in states such as Minnesota—that were combined 
 
 8  The idea of using a permanent, independent commission to draft and monitor 
sentencing guidelines is generally credited to Judge Marvin Frankel, who proposed it in 
his book. See CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER (1973). The first 
commission-drafted guidelines were placed into effect in Minnesota in 1980. See 
RICHARD S. FRASE, JUST SENTENCING: PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES FOR A WORKABLE 
SYSTEM 122-25 (2013). 
 9  Zimring, supra note 1, at 15. 
 10  Yogi Berra Quotes, https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/261863-it-s-tough-to-make-
predictions-especially-about-the-future. Yogi Berra Quotes, 
https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/261863-it-s-tough-to-make-predictions-especially-
about-the-future. 
 11  See supra notes 1-3. 
 12  In Booker v. United States, the Supreme Court held that the federal sentencing 
guidelines as written were subject to the same constitutional defects (violation of the 
rights to jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt) as the Court had previously found 
in the Washington state guidelines. See Booker v. United States, 543 U.S. 220, 244, 248 
(2005); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 313-14 (2004). To remedy those defects, 
the Court in Booker held that the federal guidelines must be deemed only advisory, not 
3
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with parole abolition. Even this limited sample of reforms shows 
considerable variation: some reforms amply confirmed Zimring’s dire 
predictions, while in other jurisdictions reformers found ways to avoid 
those predictions and, at least modestly, improve sentencing practices (or 
at least, avoid even worse outcomes). Part C briefly addresses the future. 
If we conclude, as Part B suggests, that some reforms do improve matters 
while others do not, how can we tell the difference in advance? What 
kinds of reforms, in what kinds of systems and time periods, are likely to 
improve matters? When should reformers in a given jurisdiction conclude 
that it is better to do nothing, even if that means retaining highly 
discretionary sentencing and/or parole systems that guarantee substantial 
sentencing disparity? 
A. Zimring’s Warning: Major Structural Sentencing 
Reforms Could Make Matters Worse 
Zimring’s critique of major structural sentencing reforms focused 
on proposals to abolish parole release discretion and/or to limit judicial 
sentencing decisions. But he began by setting sentencing and parole 
decisions in the broader context of criminal justice systems that 
traditionally contain “multiple discretions in sentencing.”13 In addition to 
judges and parole boards, legislatures and prosecutors make critical 
decisions that determine or limit criminal sentences. Legislatures set 
penalty ranges, with maxima and sometimes mandatory minima. 
Prosecutors decide which crimes to initially charge and which crimes to 
settle on in plea bargaining, thereby determining the actual sentencing 
range within which the judge and parole board can exercise their 
respective discretions. Since judges usually defer not only to the charge 
and resulting sentence range selected by the prosecutor, but also to any 
specific sentence or sentence cap recommended in the plea bargain, the 
prosecution is “the most important institutional determinant of a criminal 
sentence.”14 That is particularly true when the offense is subject to a 
mandatory minimum, since prosecutors have complete discretion to 
invoke the minimum or to avoid it by charging crime(s) not subject to the 
minimum.15 
Except where constrained by plea bargaining or a mandatory 
 
legally binding (however, federal sentences remain subject to appellate review under a 
standard of overall “reasonableness”). Booker, 543 U.S. at 222. 
 13  Zimring, supra note 1, at 4. 
 14  Id. at 5. 
 15  FRASE, supra note 8, at 38. 
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minimum, judges traditionally had—and still have, in most cases in most 
states—unfettered discretion to pick any sentence within the very broad 
range typically authorized by statute for the conviction offense; there are 
no sentencing rules or even guiding principles, no requirements to state 
reasons, and almost no provisions for appellate review.16 When an 
executed prison term is imposed, the parole board traditionally had—and 
still has, in most parole-retention systems—unfettered discretion to 
decide how much of the maximum term the offender has to serve before 
release on parole; there are minimal parole hearing requirements, no 
guidelines or decision principles, and no possibilities for appellate 
review.17 Zimring concluded: “[o]ther societies, less committed to the rule 
of law, or less infested with crime, might suffer such a system [of 
unguided discretion]. Powerful voices are beginning to tell us we 
cannot.”18 
1. Abolition of Parole Release Discretion 
In Zimring’s view, parole discretion had become “the most 
vulnerable” criminal justice institution, given the collapse of the 
rehabilitative ideal of in-prison treatment and highly- individualized 
predictions of future dangerousness.19 But he argued that this system 
served two valuable covert functions unrelated to rehabilitation or risk 
prediction. The first covert function is to broadly mitigate sentence 
severity: parole release decisions, because of their low visibility and 
delayed timing, allow a system to “bark louder than it really wants to 
bite”;20 judges can impose severe sentences knowing that in most cases 
the sentence will later be quietly and substantially reduced. The second 
covert function of parole release is disparity reduction: since parole is 
usually a state-level responsibility controlled by a single agency, it has the 
potential to reduce disparities in the lengths of sentences imposed, for the 
same offense, by judges and prosecutors in different localities (or even 
within a single local jurisdiction).21 Thus, Zimring argued, “three 
 
 16  See Zimring, supra note 1, at 5-6; Kevin R. Reitz, The Disassembly and Reassembly 
of U.S. Sentencing Practices, in SENTENCING AND SANCTIONS IN WESTERN COUNTRIES 
(Michael Tonry & Richard S. Frase eds., 2001), at 223-24, 231; MICHAEL TONRY, 
SENTENCING FRAGMENTS: PENAL REFORM IN AMERICA, 1975-2025 (2016), at 50-62. 
 17  Zimring, supra note 1, at 6; Reitz, supra note 16, at 223-24; TONRY, supra note 16, 
at 50-62. 
 18  Zimring, supra note 1, at 6. 
 19  Id.  
 20  Id. at 7. 
 21  In later writings, Zimring noted another pathology of America’s highly localized 
5
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discretions [prosecutor, judge, and parole board] may be better than 
two!”22 
2. Presumptive-sentence Reforms 
A number of writers and reform groups in the mid-1970s 
proposed to deal with the problems of unfettered judicial sentencing 
discretion by creating a system of legislatively-defined presumptive 
sentences for each crime, along with lists of aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances that judges could consider as grounds for departing from 
the presumption.23 Although sympathetic to the goal of structuring 
sentencing discretion, Zimring identified four major challenges 
confronting such reforms, each of which could cause the reform to do 
more harm than good.24 
(i) The incoherence of the criminal law.  Current criminal codes 
define crimes in broad terms, lumping together offenses of very different 
degrees of seriousness. As an example, Zimring cites burglary statutes 
that cover everything from armed home invasion to stealing from the 
locked glove compartment of an unlocked car.25 Moreover, the oddities 
and inconsistencies Zimring found in one of the more sophisticated 
presumptive-sentence proposals26 led him to conclude that it is difficult if 
not impossible to subdivide existing crimes into meaningful sub-
categories with specific presumptive sentences attached to each; in his 
view, “we lack the capacity to define into formal law the nuances of 
situation, intent, and social harm that condition the seriousness of 
particular criminal acts.”27 
(ii) The paradox of prosecutorial power.  Given the multiple 
“sentencing” discretions Zimring noted at the outset, reforms that abolish 
parole release discretion and substantially limit sentencing discretion, 
 
sentencing system: the “correctional free lunch,” which allows local judges and 
prosecutors to consume state prison resources without fiscal or political accountability. 
See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, THE SCALE OF IMPRISONMENT 211-15 
(1991).  
 22  Zimring, supra note 1, at 8. 
 23  Id. at 1-2, 8-9. See also Reitz, supra note 16, at 224-25 (describing reforms 
implementing such proposals).  
 24  Zimring, supra note 1, at 10-15. 
 25  Id. at 10. 
 26  For example, Zimring notes that under the Twentieth Century Task Force proposals, 
the recommended penalty for rape with bodily harm is one year longer than the penalty 
for intentional homicide. Id. at 11. 
 27  Id. at 10. 
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while doing nothing to restrict or even structure prosecutorial charging 
discretion, will simply mean that prosecutors dominate sentencing with 
no check by any other branch of government.28 In such a system many 
disparities (especially plea-versus-trial disparities) will remain –
”[l]ogically, three discretions [prosecutor, judge, and parole board] may 
be better than one.”29 
(iii) The legislative law-and-order syndrome.  Even if 
presumptive sentences are devised by an independent commission or 
other non-political body, it is all too easy for some or all penalties to be 
increased when the proposals are reviewed by the legislature: “it takes no 
more than an eraser to make a one-year ‘presumptive sentence’ into a six-
year sentence.”30 Such penalty escalations are particularly likely, Zimring 
argued, given not only the highly politicized nature of criminal justice 
policymaking in the U.S., but also the level of abstraction and symbolic 
denunciation at which legislators operate.31 Moreover, when exercising 
its traditional role of setting maximum penalties the legislature 
necessarily focuses on the worst forms of each offense, not the typical 
ways of committing that offense.32 Zimring predicted that such “penal 
inflation” would be restrained by “[t]he same prosecutorial discretions 
that limit the legislature’s ability to work reform.”33 But some offenders 
would receive the higher penalties (thus increasing disparity). And even 
if the higher penalties were consistently enforced, Zimring suggested that 
treating all offenders with unjust severity is arguably worse than retaining 
a high-disparity regime in which only some offenders are treated with 
unjust severity.34 
(iv) The lack of consensus and principle.  Zimring criticized 1970s 
sentencing reformers for asking, but never attempting to answer, the 
fundamental normative and policy questions of: “How long [in prison] is 
too long? How short is too short?”35 Yet Zimring also argued that, at least 
under existing circumstances, those questions cannot be answered 
because “[w]e lack coherent principles on which to base judgments of 
relative social harm. . . [H]ow can we mete out fair punishment without 
 
 28  Zimring, supra note 1, at 11-13. 
 29  Id. at 12. 
 30  Id. at 13. 
 31  Id. at 13–14. 
 32  TONRY, supra note 16, at 233-34. 
 33  Zimring, supra note 1, at 14. 
 34  Id.  
 35  Id. at 14–15.  
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agreeing on what is fair? How can we do justice before we define it?”36 
“Not the least of the vices of our present lawless structures of criminal 
sentencing,” Zimring concluded, “is that they mask a deeper moral and 
intellectual bankruptcy in the criminal law and the society it is supposed 
to serve.”37 
B. Subsequent Sentencing Reforms: Some Confirm 
Zimring’s Predictions, Some Do Not 
Despite his deep skepticism about the net benefits of the structural 
reforms that were being proposed and sometimes implemented in the mid-
1970s,38 Zimring acknowledged the possibility that these reforms “may 
do more good than harm.”39 As noted above, he also acknowledged the 
difficulty of predicting reform impacts. 
So, 42 years after the Consumer’s Guide was written, what have 
we learned? Which reforms suffered from one or more of the problems 
Zimring identified? Which reforms avoided those problems, or at least 
most of them? This essay cannot examine all of the major sentencing 
reforms enacted in the past four decades (and much is still unknown about 
the actual impacts of many of them), but the outlines of such an 
assessment can be sketched. The examples discussed below suggest that 
Zimring’s skepticism was well founded in some cases, but was not borne 
out in other cases, confirming the difficulty of predicting reform impacts. 
To a great extent, the success of some major structural sentencing reforms 
implemented in later years was due to features of those reforms that had 
not yet been envisioned in the mid-1970s. It is also possible that Zimring’s 
warnings helped some reformers, either directly or indirectly, to avoid his 
predictions. 
1. Parole Abolition (With and Without Sentencing Reform) 
a. The “Bark-Louder-Than-Bite” Function of Parole.  
 
 36  Id. An example of the lack of consensus on the meanings of “fairness” and “justice” 
is the sharp debate between Norval Morris and Andrew von Hirsch about the extent to 
whether the severity of punishment should strictly conform to the offender’s degree of 
blameworthiness. See Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Principles in Theory and Practice, 22 
CRIME & JUST. 363 (1997). 
 37  Zimring, supra note 1, at 15. 
 38  In 1976, California enacted its Determinate Sentencing Law, and Maine abolished 
parole release discretion. See Kevin R. Reitz, Appendix B, Reporter’s Study: The 
Question of Parole-Release Authority, Am. Law Ins., MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING 
, TENTATIVE DRAFT NO. 2 151 (2011). 
 39  Zimring, supra note 1, at 15. 
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Zimring’s theory of the covert sentence-discounting function of parole 
discretion implies that the abolition of such discretion will raise 
imprisonment rates, at least in the absence of reforms that require or 
encourage judges to reduce sentence lengths. Of course, we know that 
imprisonment rates have gone up substantially in all jurisdictions since 
the 1970s.40  So the real question is: did prison rates rise faster in parole-
abolition systems than in systems that retained parole release discretion?  
My colleague Kevin Reitz has sought to answer that question by 
comparing prison growth in each of fourteen parole-abolition states with 
the all-states prison growth rate during the same time period (i.e., in the 
years following parole abolition in that state).41 Reitz reports that prison 
rates grew faster than the all-states average in 4 of the 15 abolition states, 
while growth was below average in the other 11 states.42 The latter figure 
rises to 12 if we add in the Federal system, which also abolished parole 
discretion.43  This comparison suggests that, if anything, parole abolition 
has contributed to slower growth in prison populations! 
Of course, this was not a controlled experiment; state and federal 
jurisdictions were not randomly assigned to the parole-abolition and 
parole-retention groups. As Zimring has pointed out, there may have been 
other features of many abolition systems—including the same good-
government concerns leading to parole abolition—that contributed to 
slower prison growth in those systems.44 
Another potential problem with the conclusion reported above is 
that it is based on comparison of increases in the number of prisoners-per-
capita units. For example, Illinois’s prison growth is deemed to have been 
less than all-states prison growth from 1978 to 2009, because the Illinois 
per capita incarceration rate went up by 256 per capita units (from 94 to 
350), while in the same time period the all-states rate went up by 324 units 
(from 119 to 443).45 But in many other contexts, and especially when 
making comparisons between jurisdictions, “growth” over time is often 
expressed in relative or percentage terms. For example, we say that the 
murder rate (murders per capita) in state X increased or decreased by 10 
percent over the previous year, while the murder rate increased or 
 
 40  See CARSON, supra note 7.  
 41  See Reitz, supra note 16. 
 42  Id. at 151, Figure 1, and 153, Figure 2.  
 43  See CARSON, supra note 7. 
 44  See Franklin E. Zimring, Penal Policy and Penal Legislation in Recent American 
Experience, 58 STAN. L. REV. 323, 336–77 (2005). 
 45  CARSON, supra note 7 (reporting national and state-specific prison rates per capita). 
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decreased by 5 percent in state Y; we do not usually say that the rate 
changed by 2 murders per 100,000 residents in state X, and 3 murders per 
100,000 residents in state Y.46 Similarly, cross-jurisdictional comparisons 
of imprisonment growth rates are often expressed in percentage terms.47 
And the choice of measure matters: comparing prison growth in 
percentage terms yields quite different results for some systems.  
Continuing with the example of Illinois, that state’s prison rate increased 
by 272 percent (i.e., its 2009 rate was 3.72 times its 1978 rate: 350 divided 
by 94).; rather than being slower than average, Illinois’s percentage 
growth was exactly equal to the all-states rate of percentage growth during 
these years (443 divided by 119 equals 3.72).48 
Granted, measuring prison growth in absolute terms (per capita 
units, or even the sheer numbers of inmates) is useful for some purposes. 
As Kevin Reitz points out in his article in this issue, absolute measures 
emphasize the fiscal and human costs of escalating prison populations, 
and also show which jurisdictions are making the largest contributions to 
nationwide prison growth.49  But if the goal is to understand changes in 
prison populations, and the factors that make those populations grow 
faster or slower in different jurisdictions, growth needs to be examined in 
percentage terms, to see if some jurisdictions are growing faster or slower 
than we would expect. Equal percentage growth makes a more plausible 
baseline for comparison—whatever caused Minnesota to have a very low 
per capita incarceration rate at the outset, we would expect that those same 
factors would cause Minnesota to add a smaller number of per capita units 
than states that started out with much higher per capita rates. For example, 
if (as actually happened from the early 1980s to 2008) the all-states prison 
population increases by 300 per capita units, from 150 to 450, we would 
not expect Minnesota’s prison population to increase from 50 to 350 (a 
600 percent increase). And if it did increase by that much, we would 
immediately ask: What changed in Minnesota?50 
 
 46  See, e.g., FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, 2017 
(2018), Table 4, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2017/crime-in-the-u.s.-2017/topic-
pages/tables/table-4. 
 47  See, e.g., ZIMRING, supra note 7, at 1236–37; see also Adam Gelb & Jacob Denney, 
National Prison Rate Continues to Decline Amid Sentencing, Re-Entry Reforms (2018), 
https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/articles/2018/01/16/national-
prison-rate-continues-to-decline-amid-sentencing-re-entry-reforms.  
 48  See CARSON, supra note 7.  
 49  See Kevin R. Reitz, Measuring Changes in Incarceration Scale, 23 BERKELEY J. 
CRIM. L. (forthcoming 2019). 
 50  To take another example: the federal per capita prison rate increased from 10 in the 
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As the above figures for Illinois and Minnesota demonstrate, 
different ways of measuring prison growth can give very different results. 
Still, most of the parole-abolition systems analyzed by Professor Reitz 
come out the same under the absolute- and percentage-change measures. 
Besides Illinois and Minnesota, only two other systems come out 
differently: Kansas and the Federal system—like Minnesota, these two 
parole-abolition systems had slower-than-average growth when measured 
by the increased number of per-capita units, but higher-than-average 
growth when measured in percentage terms.51 Overall, based on 
percentage growth, eight parole-abolition systems grew more slowly than 
the all-states average, seven (including the federal system) grew faster, 
and one (Illinois) grew at the same rate as the average.52 By this measure 
parole abolition does not slow down prison growth, but it also doesn’t 
always, or even usually, lead to above-average growth. 
Of course, there are still potential selection bias problems, as 
noted above. So the question is: Can parole abolition actually cause 
slower prison growth, at least in some states? There are several plausible 
reasons to believe that it can, although further research is needed to 
confirm this. One problem with the sentence-discounting function of 
parole discretion is that it is subject to politically-motivated slowdowns 
or even temporary cessation of releases from prison, and indeed this has 
happened in some states.53 Moreover, the very existence of parole 
discretion may encourage judges to impose unreasonably severe prison 
terms that are not discounted—judges can publicly appear tough on crime, 
while assuring themselves that such severe terms don’t actually impose 
serious human and fiscal consequences; yet the sometimes illusory nature 
of parole release discretion means that offenders may serve much longer 
terms than judges expected. In addition, the variable nature of parole 
release probably makes it more difficult for legislators to predict—and 
take responsibility for—the prison-bed and fiscal impacts of severe 
 
early 1980s to 60 in 2008, an increase of 50 units. Compared to the 300-units increase for 
all states, the absolute-change measure would tell us that the federal system had much 
slower growth than the national average; in terms of relative growth, however, the 500 
percent federal increase was far greater than the 200 percent all-states growth rate. The 
latter data should lead us to ask: what changed in the federal system? The simple answer 
is: very punitive federal sentencing statutes and guidelines were enacted and implemented 
in a system with few if any budget constraints on prison growth. The budget-constraint 
factor is further discussed in Section 5, infra. 
 51  Reitz, supra note 38; Carson, supra note 7.  
 52  CARSON, supra note 7. 
 53  See Reitz, supra note 38, at 141. 
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sentencing laws and practices; conversely, parole abolition is likely to 
make impact predictions more accurate, especially when abolition is 
combined with reforms that increase the uniformity of sentences judges 
impose. Of course, more accurate impact predictions don’t guarantee 
below-average prison growth. But this result seems more likely to occur 
in a system where sentencing guidelines are created by an independent 
sentencing commission that takes seriously the goals of avoiding prison 
overcrowding and setting priorities for prison use, and that drafts its 
guidelines with the help of prison bed-impact projections.54 Such 
projections can be quite accurate and credible, making clear the 
substantial fiscal and bed impacts of severe sentences, and the tradeoffs 
that are often necessary to balance the budget and avoid prison 
overcrowding.  Increased penalty severity for certain crimes requires 
legislatures to choose one or more of the following unpleasant options: 
raise taxes to construct new prison beds,  take money from non-prison 
programs, or settle for less severity in the punishment of other crimes. 
(This policymaking process will be further examined below, in the 
discussions of federal and state guidelines.) 
To summarize: the overall relationship between commission-
drafted no-parole guidelines and prison growth is as follows: under 
Reitz’s per-capita-units measure, all 10 state and federal parole-abolition 
guidelines systems have had slower-than-average rates of prison growth; 
using the alternative, percentage-growth measure, seven of the 10 have 
had slower growth.55 
b. State-wide sentencing disparity reduction. I am not aware of 
any research addressing this second covert function of parole release 
discretion, so it is unknown to what extent parole abolition has increased 
punishment disparities. However, given what we know about how most 
parole boards function, there is reason to doubt their effectiveness in 
disparity reduction. Such a function probably works best when the board 
has, and follows, releasing guidelines. Yet in a recent survey, over half of 
 
 54  See FRASE, supra note 8, at 44 (examining the ways in which sentencing commissions 
have used prison bed impact projections to limit and prioritize prison growth).  
 55  In addition to the federal system, the nine state parole-abolition guidelines systems 
are: Delaware, Florida, Kansas, Minnesota, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Virginia, and 
Washington. Washington, D.C. has also adopted parole-abolition guidelines, but that 
jurisdiction is not separately reported here because it does not have its own prison system, 
relying instead on the Federal Bureau of Prisons. Per-capita-unit and percentage change 
measures for each system, and for all systems combined, are computed by the author 
based on data in CARSON, supra note 8 (reporting per capita incarceration rates by year, 
for each jurisdiction). 
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paroling agencies said they did not use guidelines; moreover, 80 percent 
of the agencies reported using multiple hearing panels, which increases 
the risk that similar cases will be treated differently.56 Further evidence of 
uncontrolled disparity is evident in the factors these agencies claimed to 
be considering when making release decisions: the two criteria most likely 
to yield uniform results, conviction offense(s) and prior record, were said 
to be the least important release criteria, whereas factors that would 
increase disparity—input from the prosecution, the inmate’s family, and 
the sentencing judge—were cited as the most important.57 
2. Legislative Presumptive Sentencing 
In 1976, California became the first state to enact a version of the 
legislative presumptive sentencing regime advocated by a number of the 
writers and committees Zimring cited.58 Within three years, seven other 
states had followed suit: Arizona, Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, New Jersey, 
New Mexico, and North Carolina.59 But Colorado and North Carolina 
later abandoned this approach, and no state has adopted it since 1979.60 
That history casts serious doubt on the desirability, or at least the practical 
viability, of this sentencing reform option. But it is difficult to say to what 
extent the failure of this model was due to any or all of the four objections 
Zimring raised, namely: the incoherence of the criminal law, the paradox 
of prosecutorial power, the legislative law-and-order syndrome, and the 
lack of consensus and principle. To my knowledge, there has never been 
a comprehensive assessment of this form of structured sentencing, and 
how it actually worked in practice across multiple systems.61 
This research gap may have been due not only to the fact that 
legislatures seemed to have abandoned the legislative-presumptive 
approach, but also because it was replaced by commission-drafted 
 
 56  See Ebony L. Ruhland et al., The Continuing Leverage of Releasing Authorities: 
Findings from a National Survey, Executive Summary, ROBINA INST. OF CRIM. L. & 
CRIM. JUST. 4 (2016) at 4. 
 57  Id. at 3-4. This source also reports that 36 of the 40 responding states use risk 
assessment instruments, Id. at 3, However, the source provides no information about how 
frequently or consistently such tools are being applied. 
 58  See FRASE, supra note 8, at 167. 
 59  Id. 
 60  Id.  
 61  Adoption of a comprehensive structured sentencing regime provides an opportunity 
to recodify and modernize criminal law, reducing the “incoherence” Zimring noted. 
However, New Jersey appears to be the only legislative-presumptive state that took 
advantage of this opportunity. See id.   
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sentencing guidelines and/or crime-specific mandatory-minimum 
sentencing statutes, both of which have received substantial scholarly 
attention.62 Zimring’s objections seem so manifestly correct, when 
applied to mandatory penalties, that I will not consider them further. In 
the remaining sections of this part I examine two very different versions 
of the sentencing guidelines model (both of which were combined with 
parole abolition). The first version displays most of the defects Zimring 
attributed to legislative presumptive sentencing, while the second version 
seems to have avoided most of those defects. In Sections 3 and 4 below I 
address Zimring’s four challenges to structured sentencing, as they apply 
to the federal guidelines and to the guidelines model adopted in Minnesota 
and several other states. In Section 5, I return to the question of parole 
abolition and contrast the very different prison-growth patterns in the 
federal system compared to state guidelines systems. 
3. The (pre-Booker) Federal Guidelines 
a. The incoherence of the criminal law.  The federal system 
likely manifests this problem as much or more than any state system. 
Federal criminal law has long been in need of comprehensive 
recodification; the last recodification was in 1948, and an ambitious 
federal code reform of the early 1970s failed to win Congressional 
approval.63 As a result, many federal crimes are defined in very broad 
terms, and it is also likely that many of these statutes fail to reflect offense 
and offender factors that are deemed important to contemporary lawyers 
and judges. To remedy these problems, Chapter Two of the Federal 
Guidelines Manual breaks down most federal crimes into numerous 
subcategories, but this solution surely confirms Zimring’s prediction that 
such an exercise would “make our present [sentencing] statutes look like 
Readers Digest Condensed Books.”64 The widespread dissatisfaction with 
 
 62  See generally TONRY, supra note 16 (examining various sentencing reforms and 
research on those reforms since the 1970s).   
 63  See generally John L. McClellan, Codification, Reform, and Revision: The Challenge 
of a Modern Federal Criminal Code, 1971 DUKE L. J. 663 (1971) (summarizing federal 
code revisions up to and including the 1971 proposals of the National Commission on 
Reform of Federal Criminal Laws). See also TONRY, supra note 16, at 102, 162-63, 230 
(discussing the Commission’s unsuccessful federal law reform effort). 
 64  UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL (2018), §§ 2A1.1 to 
2X7.2; Zimring, supra note 1, at 10. Theft and drug crimes provide good examples of the 
level of detail in Chapter Two of the Manual. The black letter and application notes for 
theft crimes take up 29 single-spaced pages in the Manual; drug crimes take up 50 pages. 
UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, supra, §§ 2B1.1 to 2B2.1 and 2D1.1 to 2D3.2. 
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the overly-detailed federal guidelines also lends support to Zimring’s 
conclusion that  “we may simply lack the ability to comprehensively 
define in advance those elements of an offense that should be considered 
in fixing a criminal sentence.”65 Yet, as discussed in the next section, 
some state guidelines have succeeded in doing so. 
b. The paradox of prosecutorial power.  Zimring predicted that 
any reform abolishing parole release discretion and substantially limiting 
sentencing discretion, while doing nothing to restrict or even structure 
prosecutorial charging discretion, would allow prosecutors to dominate 
sentencing and would continue widespread disparity.66 The Federal 
Guidelines sought to limit prosecutorial dominance by means of a limited 
form of “real-offense” sentencing—the much-criticized Relevant 
Conduct provisions which increase recommended sentence severity based 
on numerous factors that go beyond the elements of the conviction 
offense(s).67 But studies of the actual operation of the federal guidelines 
suggest that, at least prior to the Booker decision rendering the federal 
guidelines advisory or at least less “mandatory,” prosecutors retained and 
employed substantial discretionary charging power to select the desired 
sentence.68  And because judicial departure power under the pre-Booker 
guidelines was quite limited, unlike departure powers in state systems, 
Zimring’s prediction was generally correct: “the charge at conviction 
determines the sentence.”69 
c. The legislative law-and-order syndrome.  Zimring predicted 
that legislatures would often be tempted to increase penalties 
recommended by a sentencing commission.70 This does not seem to have 
occurred in the federal system, but that was not due to the absence of the 
underlying dynamics Zimring identified. Congress, like state legislatures, 
probably acts at a high level of abstraction, engaging in symbolic 
denunciation and erring on the side of severity to ensure adequate 
punishment for the worst forms of each offense. Moreover, federal 
sentencing policy would seem to be at least as politicized as state-level 
policy. Indeed, it may even be more politicized, given the unique nature 
of federal criminal justice policymaking. In the federal system, political 
 
 65  Zimring, supra note 1, at 11; TONRY, supra note 16, at 107–15 (noting detail of and 
negative reactions to the guidelines). 
 66  Zimring, supra note 1, at 11–13. 
 67  UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, supra note 64, § 1B1.3. 
 68  See MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 82–83 (1996). 
 69  Zimring, supra note 1, at 11–12. 
 70  Id. at 13–14. 
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urges to appear “tough on crime” are rarely constrained by concerns about 
fiscal impact and the possibility that taxes will have to be raised, or other 
popular programs cut back, to pay for severe new criminal penalties. 
Congress need not balance its budget, and even with massive increases, 
federal prison costs remain a tiny fraction of the total federal budget.71 
The most likely reason why the federal commission’s initial set of 
proposed penalties were not escalated by Congress is that those penalties 
(developed by appointees of President Reagan) were already very 
severe.72 Moreover, the commission continued to ratchet up penalties in 
the early years of the guidelines, sometimes in response to new federal 
legislation but often seemingly on the commission’s own motion.73 As 
discussed more fully in Section 5 below, severe federal statutes and 
recommended guidelines sentences have caused federal prison 
populations to grow faster than the prison population in almost any state, 
including most states with parole-abolition guidelines. 
d. The lack of consensus and principle.  It does not appear that 
either Congress or the federal commission seriously tried to answer 
Zimring’s underlying policy questions, “How long [in prison] is too long? 
How short is too short?”74 The only clear answer Congress seemed to give 
in the 1984 statute creating the commission was that in many cases 
existing federal sentences were too lenient.75 As for the commission, it 
first experimented with several complex formulas supposedly based on 
offender culpability or crime control.76 But the commission eventually 
settled upon a set of recommended penalties intended to achieve all 
traditional punishment purposes, and largely based on existing sentencing 
 
 71  See generally, Richard S. Frase, Lessons of State Guideline Reforms, 8 FED. SENT’G 
RPTR. 39 (1995) (discussing the failure to consider prison-bed impacts when drafting the 
federal guidelines). However, it is possible that fiscal impact has recently gotten more 
attention in the federal system, due to the Sequester budgeting laws that went into effect 
in 2011 and 2013. See, e.g., Budget Control Act of 2011, Pub. L. 112-25 (2011).  
 72  See TONRY, supra note 68, at 72, 77–79. 
 73  Numerous guidelines amendments were adopted in the first two years after the 
guidelines went into effect, and most of them increased recommended sentence severity. 
See U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, 1989 
Edit., App. C (1989) (listing all amendments since October 1987), 
https://www.ussc.gov/guidelines/archive/1989-federal-sentencing-guidelines-manual. 
 74  See Zimring, supra note 1, at 14–15.  
 75  See generally Anthony N. Doob, The United States Sentencing Commission 
Guidelines: If You Don’t Know Where You Are Going, You Might Not Get There, in THE 
POLITICS OF SENTENCING REFORM (Chris Clarkson & Rod Morgan eds., 1995). 
 76  See TONRY, supra note 68, at 86–88. 
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practices77– an approach that Zimring once likened to “adding up our last 
hundred mistakes, dividing by a hundred and achieving justice.”78 Some 
writers interpret the federal guidelines as implicitly adopting a “limiting 
retributive” model, under which desert principles set outer limits on 
penalty severity within which crime control goals are pursued.79 But other 
writers either find no coherent theory of punishment, implicit or explicit, 
in the federal guidelines,80 or conclude that the dominant underlying 
theory is crime control.81 
4. The Minnesota Guidelines (and Similar Guidelines in Other 
States) 
In contrast to the federal system, Minnesota and similar state 
parole-abolition guidelines have avoided most of the problems with 
structured sentencing reform that Zimring identified. 
a. The incoherence of the criminal law.  Some state guidelines 
commissions began with a major advantage over the federal 
commission—a more coherent, or at least more recently re-codified, state 
criminal law.82 In addition, state guidelines drafters have given much 
greater emphasis to the values of simplicity and case-level judicial 
discretion. State reformers have not tried to address and provide 
presumptive sentences for every variation of every crime, and as a result 
state guidelines are much less detailed..83 State systems also frequently 
provide, in the guidelines and/or case law, a wide range of permissible 
grounds for departure.84 
 
 77  UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, supra note 64, at 4–5.  
 78  ZIMRING & FRASE, supra note 5, at 909. 
 79  See, e.g., Paul J. Hofer & Mark H. Allenbaugh, The Reason Behind the Rules: Finding 
and Using the Philosophy of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
19 (2003). 
 80  See, e.g., TONRY, supra note 68, at 86–88.  
 81  See, e.g., Aaron Rappaport, Rationalizing the Commission: The Philosophical 
Premises of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, 52 EMORY L.J. 557 (2003). 
 82  For example, the Minnesota Criminal Code, MINN. STAT. Chapter 609, was 
substantially revised and renumbered in 1963, 15 years before the guidelines commission 
began its work. See Maynard E. Pirsig, Proposed Revision of the Minnesota Criminal 
Code, 47 MINN. L. REV. 417 (1963); McClellan, supra note 63, at 714.   
 83  See TONRY, supra note 16, at 130; FRASE, supra note 8, at 46-47. 
 84  See TONRY, supra note 68, at 77 (noting strict limits on departure powers under the 
federal guidelines); FRASE, supra note 8, at 121-67 (summarizing major features of state 
and federal guidelines systems, and noting the greater flexibility of state guidelines). See 
generally University of Minnesota, SENTENCING GUIDELINES RESOURCE CENTER,  
https://sentencing.umn.edu (providing further information on current guidelines grids and 
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b. The paradox of prosecutorial power.  Only one guidelines 
state, Washington, has attempted to deal with prosecutorial discretion, and 
that state does so only to a very limited extent.85 Nevertheless, there do 
not seem to have been frequent complaints in guidelines states about 
prosecutorial dominance of the sentencing process.86 If that perception 
accurately reflects actual practice, it is probably not because state 
prosecutors are less political (almost all chief prosecutors are elected 
officials), or play less adversary roles in state systems, or have less 
potential to dominate sentencing through their unregulated charging 
powers.87  If anything, state prosecutors have more potential sentencing 
power—every state guidelines system bases its recommended sentences 
on conviction offense(s), and rejects almost all forms of “real-offense” 
enhancement.88 
Perhaps there are other explanatory factors (often unique to the 
particular state), but I believe there are two reasons why state guidelines 
do not seem to be excessively prosecution-dominated. First, state 
guidelines retain sufficient judicial discretion to mitigate unfairly-severe 
sentences produced by prosecutorial over-charging. Second, given the 
dynamics of the adversary system, unduly lenient punishment produced 
by prosecutorial under-charging is not a serious concern. The latter 
assertion is probably also true in federal courts, which means that the 
federal Relevant Conduct enhancements—designed to counteract 
prosecutorial charging leniency—are addressed to a non-existent 
problem. 
c. The legislative law-and-order syndrome.  Not all states with 
guidelines have had slower-than-average prison growth, but most states 
with parole-abolition guidelines have.89 Many state guidelines reforms 
 
departure factors in state and federal guidelines systems). 
 85  See FRASE, supra note 8, at 146. 
 86  It’s difficult to document the absence of something. But in over 25 years of reading 
sentencing research papers and talking to sentencing policymakers and practitioners from 
around the country, I cannot recall anyone complaining about prosecutorial dominance 
of sentencing in a state guidelines system (except with regard to the application of 
mandatory-minimum statutes in some of these states).   
 87  See TONRY, supra note 16, at 24-5, 160 (describing the elected status and adversary 
roles of American prosecutors). 
 88  TONRY, supra note 68, at 77–78; FRASE, supra note 8, at 163.  
 89  See supra note 55. In contrast, some parole-retention guidelines states have had much 
faster than average prison growth. For example, Pennsylvania’s prison rate rose from 88 
to 407 (363 percent growth) from 1982 (the first year of that state’s guidelines) to 2009, 
whereas for all states the growth rate over that time period was 177 percent. CARSON, 
supra note 7. 
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were prompted at least in part by concerns about uncontrolled prison 
growth.90 When the legislature wants to use guidelines for this purpose it 
is likely to succeed, especially where the guidelines are sufficiently 
binding or otherwise closely followed in practice to permit accurate prison 
bed-impact projections.91 This resource management technique was 
pioneered in Minnesota in the late 1970s, and was later employed in many 
other guidelines states.92 The technique had not yet been imagined in the 
mid-1970s, when the Consumer’s Guide was written. 
d. The lack of consensus and principle.  State guidelines have 
found ways to address Zimring’s unanswerable questions—”How long 
[in prison] is too long? How short is too short?” —as well as his concern 
that “[w]e lack coherent principles on which to base judgments of relative 
social harm” or to define “justice.” As to the former, although no simple 
formula can tell us when a given penalty is too severe in absolute terms, 
the strong desire of some guidelines states to stay within existing or 
already-funded prison capacity and avoid overcrowding, placed an upper 
limit on aggregate penalty severity and also encouraged these states to set 
priorities for the use of limited and expensive prison resources.93  As for 
setting minimum severity, state commissions seem to have managed to 
reach consensus on what crimes are so serious that prison should be 
recommended even for first offenders.94 Given the desire to set prison-use 
priorities and/or increase sentencing proportionality, commissions also 
found ways to reach consensus on the rank-ordering of offense severity.95 
Of course, without a coherent theory of the validity and priority 
of various punishment purposes it is difficult to defend important 
sentencing policy choices. Those choices include the rank-ordering of 
offenses according to their “severity,” the definition of relevant prior 
record and other offender-based factors, and the identification of offense 
 
 90  See Frase, supra note 71, at 39; SENTENCING GUIDELINES RESOURCE CENTER, supra 
note 84. 
 91  See Reitz, supra note 38, at 154–57. 
 92  See FRASE, supra note 8, at 121–25.  
 93  Id. 
 94  All guidelines identify some offenders, convicted of very serious crimes, who are 
recommended for prison regardless of their prior record. See, e.g., SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES RESOURCE CENTER, supra note 84, “Repository” tab (containing guidelines 
grids for most systems, all of which recommend prison, even for first offenders, at or 
above a given level of offense severity).  
 95  See, e.g., DALE G. PARENT, STRUCTURING CRIMINAL SENTENCES: THE EVOLUTION OF 
MINNESOTA’S SENTENCING GUIDELINES 55–62 (1988) (describing the procedures used to 
construct Minnesota’s offense-severity rankings).  
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and offender factors that require a prison sentence rather than probation. 
Some state guidelines commissions just muddled through, without 
articulating a governing sentencing theory. Other states expressly based 
their guidelines on a limiting retributive (or “modified just deserts”) 
model.96 Some of these systems developed a full-fledged hybrid model to 
guide decisions by the commission when setting presumptive sentences, 
and decisions by judges about whether to depart from guidelines 
recommendations. In Minnesota, for example, retributive principles 
regulate commission and judicial decisions about the duration of prison 
terms, while crime-control offender-based factors (prior record and, 
exceptionally, offender amenability to prison or to probation) determine 
questions of “disposition” (the latter relates to whether a given offender 
is recommended for prison or for probation, and whether it is appropriate 
for the judge to depart from that recommendation).97 
It remains true, as Zimring argued, that sentencing grids and 
specific presumptive-sentences imply a false precision.98 But presumptive 
sentences under state guidelines are only a starting point for judges, based 
on perceptions of appropriate penalties for “typical” crimes of each type. 
These starting points are almost always defined as a range, not a specific 
number.99 Surely judges should be given at least that much guidance; 
otherwise, they will often have very different starting points, and probably 
even more different end points. Moreover, the false precision problem is 
much attenuated if, as all state guidelines (as well as the post-Booker 
federal guidelines) provide, judges have substantial departure power, and 
if judges are also given underlying sentencing principles and standards to 
guide the choice and extent of departure. 
5. Parole Abolition in Federal and State Guidelines Systems 
As noted previously, all 10 parole-abolition guidelines systems 
have had slower rates of prison population growth, when measured by 
change in prisoners-per-capita units, than the growth rates for all states 
combined, and seven of the 10 systems had slower growth in percentage 
 
 96  See FRASE, supra note 8, 121–67. 
 97  Id. at 128. 
 98  See Franklin E. Zimring, Principles of Criminal Sentencing, Plain and Fancy, 82 NW 
U. L. REV. 73, 78 (1987). 
 99  See, e.g., SENTENCING GUIDELINES RESOURCE CENTER, supra note 84, “Repository” 
tab (containing guidelines grids for most systems, almost all of which provide sentencing 
ranges — sometimes quite broad ranges — for each combination of offense severity and 
prior record).  
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terms.100 The three exceptions are Kansas, Minnesota, and the federal 
system. Prison growth in Kansas, from adoption of its guidelines through 
2009, was only slightly higher than the national growth rate in that time 
period—Kansas’s prison rate was 37 percent higher in 2009, while for all 
states the prison rate was 34 percent higher.101 
As for Minnesota, its somewhat higher than average prison 
growth rate from 1980 to 2009 (288 percent, versus 243 percent for all 
states) is largely explained by the fact that the number of felons sentenced 
each year grew much faster in Minnesota than the average for all states.102 
Moreover, there were several other reasons to predict above-average 
growth in Minnesota prison populations after 1980. First, there was a 
general tendency in these years for states with the lowest incarceration 
rates to grow faster than states with the highest rates.103 Indeed, this is 
what one would expect. Low-rate states are likely to have more marginal 
offenders who can be shifted from probation to prison (in high-rate states, 
those offenders are already in prison). Low-rate states are also likely to 
have more room, budget-wise to increase their penalties. And in an era of 
universally-rising sentence severity, low-rate states may feel pressure to 
catch up to what other states are doing. Second, Minnesota is a relatively 
prosperous state, and could have afforded even greater penalty increases 
than it enacted. Third, to the extent that racial hostility and lack of 
empathy produce more punitive penalties, Minnesota sentencing might be 
expected to become more severe—the proportions of non-whites among 
 
 100  See supra note 55. In contrast, the six states (California, Maine, Indiana, Illinois, 
Arizona, and, for most years, Wisconsin) that abolished parole discretion without 
enacting guidelines for judges tended to have faster-than-average prison growth in 
percentage terms. Only one of these states (Maine) had slower than average growth; four 
were faster; and one (Illinois) had average growth.; See Reitz, supra note 38, at 151, 
Figure 1 (identifying parole-abolition states); Carson, supra note 7 (reporting per capita 
rates for each state, by year, and for all states combined). 
 101  CARSON, supra note 7. 
 102  See Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Policies and Practices in Minnesota (2016). 
http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199935383.001.0001/o
xfordhb-9780199935383-e-148?print=pdf, Section III.B.4 (Explaining that for the years 
with comparable caseload data, 1988 through 2006, annual felony convictions increased 
by 117 percent in Minnesota, and by an estimated 70 percent for all states. From 1981 to 
1988, Minnesota’s moderate prison growth was exactly equal to its caseload increase. Id. 
From 2001 to 2015, Minnesota’s prison population (including inmates held in local jails 
with sentences of over one year) increased by 63 percent, while the sentenced felony 
caseload increased by 55 percent.) See Richard S. Frase & Kelly Lyn Mitchell, Why Are 
Minnesota’s Prison Populations Continuing to Rise in an Era of Decarceration?, 30 FED. 
SENT’G REP. 114 (2017). 
 103  See ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 21, at 221. 
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Minnesota residents and convicted offenders increased substantially in the 
1980s and 90s.104 
The federal system is an entirely different matter: its 281 percent 
prison growth rate from inception of the guidelines in 1987 to 2009 was 
over two and half times greater than the all-states growth rate in those 
years (107 percent).105 Yet the annual number of sentenced cases grew 
only modestly faster in federal than in state courts.106 As noted previously, 
a major difference between the federal system and almost all state 
guidelines systems is the lack of budget constraints on federal prison 
growth. Perhaps for this reason, the federal commission has never used 
prison-impact assessments to restrain the severity of recommended 
sentences.107 The commission apparently did not view dramatic growth in 
prison populations and serious prison overcrowding as major problems, 
or at least not as problems to be addressed by the commission. 
As for Zimring’s other covert function of parole release—
statewide sentence-disparity reduction—this function is not needed under 
a regime of statewide sentencing guidelines that judges follow in most 
cases (because the guidelines are legally binding or for other reasons, such 
as peer pressure or single-court-house collegiality and consensus). Still, 
there may be a need, at least in some parole-abolition systems, for the kind 
of “second look” sentence-reduction powers (beyond executive 
clemency) that are recommended under the revised Model Penal Code.108 
C. The Future of Sentencing Reform in the United States 
“Reform, Sir, Reform, don’t speak to me of Reform, things are 
bad enough as they are.”109 
 
 104  For example, Minnesota’s Black population more than quadrupled from 1980 to 
2005, and from 1981 to 2005 the percentage of Whites among sentenced felons fell from 
82 to 62 percent, while the percentage of Blacks rose from 11 percent to 24 percent. See 
Richard S. Frase, What Explains Persistent Racial Disproportionality in Minnesota’s 
Prison and Jail Populations?, 38 CRIME & JUSTICE 201–280 (2009). 
 105  See CARSON, supra note 7.  
 106  See Hindelang Criminal Justice Research Center, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice 
Statistics, Criminal defendants sentenced in U.S. District Courts, by type and length of 
sentence 1945-2010, Table 5.23.2010 (showing sentenced federal offenders increased by 
86 percent from 1988 to 2006; as noted previously, the all-states sentenced felony 
caseload increased by 70 percent). 
 107  See Frase, supra note 71. 
 108  See American Law Institute, MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, PROPOSED FINAL 
DRAFT, §§ 305.6, 305.7, 305.8 (2017). 
 109  ZIMRING & FRASE, supra note 5, at xxxi (quoting Maudsley). 
22
Berkeley Journal of Criminal Law, Vol. 23, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/bjcl/vol23/iss3/1
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38S46H634
ISSUE 23:3 FALL 2018 
2018 CONSUMERS’ GUIDE 23 
The majority of American states retain broad parole release 
discretion for most offenders, and a majority of states also place few limits 
on judicial sentencing discretion. Such unrestrained discretion in deciding 
criminal punishments is intolerable in any system committed to the rule 
of law. That was true when Frank Zimring said it in 1976,110 and it remains 
true today. 
But what exactly should we do about these problems, especially 
if predicting particular reform impacts is at best “hazardous?”111 Indeed, 
can we even untangle the effects of different sentencing laws and 
structures after those effects have occurred? Does anything we do actually 
matter, and if so, how can we tell given the intractable problems of 
selection bias when we attempt to compare reform and non-reform 
jurisdictions?112 To take a concrete example from my home state: would 
Minnesota’s legal and political “culture” have caused it to retain its 
ranking as one of the very lowest prison-rate states, even without the 
adoption of parole-abolition sentencing guidelines designed to stay within 
prison capacity? It is difficult to know for sure even though, as noted 
above, there were several reasons to expect greater prison growth in 
Minnesota than actually occurred. And even if we conclude that adoption 
of a sentencing guidelines system such as Minnesota’s tends to produce 
slower growth in state prison populations, these effects seem to be highly 
contingent on the particular jurisdiction.113 
Finally, apart from “how we got here,” to the current levels of 
mass incarceration that exist in all American states,114 how can we predict 
which sentencing laws and structures are most likely to help us 
substantially reverse course? From the peak mass incarceration year, 
2008, to 2016, the rate of state imprisonment in the U.S. declined by 11 
percent, and 22 states had greater-than-average declines in their 
imprisonment rates (ranging from a 13 percent decline in Indiana to a 35 
percent decline in Alaska).115 But an examination of those 22 states 
reveals no consistent patterns: above-average declines in prison rates have 
 
 110  Zimring, supra note 1, at 6, 15. 
 111  Id. at 15. 
 112  See Zimring, supra note 44 for further discussion. 
 113  See, e.g., ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 21, at 160–62, 201–04. 
 114  See generally AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM IN CRIME AND PUNISHMENT (Kevin R. 
Reitz ed., 2018); see also Richard S. Frase, Learning from European Punishment 
Practices – and from Similar American Practices, Now and In the Past, 27 FED. SENT’G 
REP. 19, 22 (2014) (describing converging factors that created “a perfect storm of 
punitiveness” in late 20th Century America). 
 115  See Gelb and Denney, supra note 47. 
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occurred in all regions of the country, in large as well as small states, in 
states that previously had very high and very low incarceration rates, and 
in states with and without major sentencing and parole reforms. 
Given these reform uncertainties, it is likely that some systems are 
better off with the devils they know – or, to adapt the popular adage: “If 
it ain’t broke too bad, don’t fix it.” On the other hand, some systems are 
clearly very “broke,” often suffering from both the excesses of mass 
incarceration and the corrosive unfairness of manifest disparities in the 
sentences imposed on comparable offenders. 
Zimring’s Consumers’ Guide warns us that, in sentencing reform, 
there are no simple answers. But as he insisted, we must still try to 
improve our sentencing systems. Moreover, there is much we can learn 
from our past efforts. The lessons of over 40 years of sentencing reform, 
and of Zimring’s persistent critiques of those efforts,116 are that reform 
impacts are highly contingent: system context and reform details matter—
a lot. That was, and remains, Zimring’s essential message. 
 
 
 116  See, e.g., ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 21, and Zimring, supra note 44.  
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